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Abstract
Intergroup conflict is often driven by an individual’s motivation to protect oneself and fellow group members against the
threat of out-group aggression, including the tendency to pre-empt out-group threat through a competitive approach.
Here we link such defense-motivated competition to oxytocin, a hypothalamic neuropeptide involved in reproduction and
social bonding. An intergroup conflict game was developed to disentangle whether oxytocin motivates competitive
approach to protect (i) immediate self-interest, (ii) vulnerable in-group members, or (iii) both. Males self-administered
oxytocin or placebo (double-blind placebo-controlled) and made decisions with financial consequences to themselves, their
fellow in-group members, and a competing out-group. Game payoffs were manipulated between-subjects so that non-
cooperation by the out-group had high vs. low impact on personal payoff (personal vulnerability), and high vs. low impact
on payoff to fellow in-group members (in-group vulnerability). When personal vulnerability was high, non-cooperation was
unaffected by treatment and in-group vulnerability. When personal vulnerability was low, however, in-group vulnerability
motivated non-cooperation but only when males received oxytocin. Oxytocin fuels a defense-motivated competitive
approach to protect vulnerable group members, even when personal fate is not at stake.
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Introduction
Intergroup relations are often marked by non-cooperation and
competitive behavior, creating levels of aggression and violence
that bring about severe societal costs [1–3]. Intergroup hostilities
have been traced back to the greedy desire among members of one
group to subordinate rivaling out-groups and acquire their
resources [4,5], and/or the defensive motivation to serve and
protect the in-group against possible out-group threat [6–8].
Competitive approach of, and defense-motivated non-cooper-
ation towards rivaling out-groups serves the individual’s personal
interests, as it signals the individual’s loyalty and commitment to
fellow group members, encouraging inclusion rather than exclu-
sion from profitable within-group exchange and cooperation [5,9–
11]. At the same time, defense-motivated non-cooperation serves
group-interests because it may pre-empt possible attack by rivaling
out-groups and may deter them from aggressing against the in-
group [7,12]. Accordingly, group-living animals such as Siberian
Jays and Meerkats aggress against rivals and predators especially
in the presence of offspring, and such parental mobbing increases
offspring survival and provides for group formation and cooper-
ative kin-societies [13–15]. In humans, such parochial altruism has
likewise been associated with group survival and prosperity [4,11].
Because of its functionality to individual and group survival, the
human brain may have evolved neurobiological mechanisms that
support and sustain defense-motivated non-cooperation towards
rivaling out-groups [16–18]. Here we examine this possibility by
focusing on oxytocin, an evolutionary ancient neuropeptide that is
produced in the hypothalamus and functions as hormone and
neurotransmitter [19,20]. In humans, oxytocin projects into the
amygdala, hippocampus, and regions of the spinal cord that
regulate the parasympathic branch of the autonomic nervous
system [21,22]. It attenuates stress responses [23–25], and reduces
amygdala activation and its coupling to brainstem centers
responsible for autonomic and behavioral components of fear
[26–28]. Furthermore, oxytocin interacts with dopaminergic,
reward processing areas [29–31], that may motivate cooperation
towards reciprocating others [32]. Indeed, at the behavioral level,
oxytocin reduces betrayal aversion [26,33], and motivates trust
and cooperation especially when others are familiar [34], not
untrustworthy [35], and belonging to one’s own group [17,36].
Three lines of evidence suggest that oxytocin not only promotes
cooperation, but is involved also in defense-motivated non-
cooperation towards rivaling out-groups. In free-living meerkats,
infusion of oxytocin versus placebo motivated an array of
cooperative behaviors including longer time-on-guard [37], in
lactating rats bred for high anxiety it motivated maternal
aggression against virgin intruders [38], and in breast-feeding
mothers plasma oxytocin predicted hostility towards a female
stranger [39]. In humans, intranasal oxytocin versus placebo
motivated more positive evaluations of the in-group compared to
rivaling out-groups [40], and non-cooperation towards rivaling
out-groups especially when out-group threat was high [17,41].
However, because in these studies the individual’s self-interest
perfectly correlated with in-group interests, it is unknown whether,
in intergroup competition, oxytocin motivates protection of (i)
immediate self-interest, (ii) vulnerable in-group members, or (iii)
some combination of both.
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Disentangling these different possibilities would advance our
understanding of the role of oxytocin in the evolution of group life.
If, in intergroup conflict, oxytocin-motivated competitive ap-
proach varies as a function of the extent to which self-interest is at
stake, we have to re-interpret previous work as showing that
oxytocin up-regulates what Adam Smith called ‘‘enlightened self-
interest.’’ But if oxytocin-motivated competitive approach varies
(also) as a function of the extent to which the interests of fellow in-
group members is at stake, we may be in a position to infer that
oxytocin shifts the individual’s focus away from immediate self-
interest and towards in-group interests, and that oxytocin’s
functions include a tendency to tend-and-defend the in-group.
To disentangle these possibilities, we developed a behavioral
game in which participants acted as the representative of a group
of three that competed with a protagonist representing a three-
person out-group. Cardinal payoffs in the game were manipulated
so that non-cooperation by the out-group had strong versus weak
impact on the participant’s personal outcome (personal vulnera-
bility) and, independently, the outcomes for the two other in-group
members that were represented by the participant (in-group
vulnerability). We expected to replicate earlier work [17,36]
showing that intranasal administration of oxytocin rather than
placebo (i) motivates tending for the in-group. We tested the new
hypotheses that even when personal vulnerability is low, oxytocin
(ii) motivates in-group protection; and (iii) leads to non-coopera-
tion towards the out-group protagonist, especially when in-group
vulnerability is high.
Methods Overview
In keeping with past work [26,27], hypotheses were tested in a
double-blind placebo controlled between-subjects design, with 102
males self-administering 24 IU oxytocin or placebo through nasal
spray. After the standard loading time of forty minutes [26],
participants were, on the basis of a trivial criterion, assigned to a
Figure 1. Game Structures used in the Experiment. (A). Between-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma (BG-PD) with T(emptation).R(eward).P(u-
nishment).S(ucker); subscript IP (In-Group Player) are payoffs to the participant; subscript IG (In-Group) are payoffs to other in-group members;
subscript OP (Out-group Player) are payoffs to the out-group protagonist; subscripts OG (Our-Group) are payoffs to other out-group members.
Participant (row player) and Out-Group Player (column player) decide between coop (cooperation) and non-coop (non-cooperation); (B). Payoff
Structure in the High Personal Vulnerability/High In-Group Vulnerability Condition; (C). Payoff Structure in the Low Personal Vulnerability/Low In-
Group Vulnerability Condition; (D). Payoff Structure in the High Personal Vulnerability/Low In-Group Vulnerability Condition; (E). Payoff Structure in
the Low Personal Vulnerability/Low In-Group Vulnerability Condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046751.g001
Oxytocin Motivates Protection
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e46751
three-person group and informed that they would engage in a
decision making task with members of another three-person group
for real money (Materials and Methods) [17]. Participants were
paired to a member of the other group, told that they would
simultaneously decide to cooperate (option A) or not (option B),
and that decisions accrued financial earnings to themselves, the
two other in-group members they represented, and to the out-
group representative and his constituency.
The game was modeled after the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD;
Fig. 1A) so that participant’s decision combined with the out-
group representative’s decision yields four possible payoffs to all
individuals involved (i.e., participant, his in-group members, the
out-group representative, and his out-group members): Tempta-
tion (T), Reward (R), Punishment (P), and Sucker (S), which are
ordered as T.R.P.S [42,43]. Fig. 1B shows that if both
participant and out-group representative cooperate, both in-group
and out-group obtain the Reward payoff of 7, which exceeds the
Punishment payoff for mutual non-cooperation of 6 (i.e.,
[R2P]= [726] = 1 (henceforth Cooperator’s Gain). The dilemma
occurs because both participant and out-group representative
obtain even higher payoffs for their own group by non-
cooperation. Non-cooperation may reflect the greedy desire to
exploit the out-group, and/or the defensive desire to protect the
in-group against out-group non-cooperation. First, if the out-group
were to cooperate, participants obtain higher outcomes for their
in-group by non-cooperation (T) than by cooperation (R) (in
Fig. 1B: [T2R]= [827] = 1; henceforth Greed). Second, if the
out-group were to non-cooperate, participants obtain higher
outcomes for their in-group by non-cooperation (P) than by
cooperation (S) (in Fig. 1B: [P2S]= [621] = 5; henceforth Fear).
In Fig. 1B, Fear to participant as in-group representative
(henceforth Personal Vulnerability) is at the same level as Fear to
other in-group members (henceforth In-Group Vulnerability). By
manipulating cardinal payoffs [17,43], we varied Personal
Vulnerability independently from In-Group Vulnerability
(Fig. 1B—Fig. 1E). In Fig. 1B and 1D, Personal Vulnerability is
high at [P2S]= [621] = 5, whereas it is low at [P2S]= [625] = 1
in Fig. 1C and 1E. In Fig. 1B and 1E, In-Group Vulnerability is
high at [P2S]= [621] = 5, whereas In-Group Vulnerability is low
at [P2S] = [625]= 1 in Fig. 1C and 1D. Because Cooperator’s
Gain and Greed are constant across games, higher non-
cooperation in Fig. 1B and 1D compared to Fig. 1C and 1E
must reflect a desire to protect oneself against a possibly non-
cooperative out-group representative; higher non-cooperation in
Fig. 1B and 1E compared to Fig. 1C and 1D must reflect a desire
to protect one’s in-group against a possibly non-cooperative out-
group representative. Thus, self-protection as a motive for non-
cooperation is stronger when the out-group representative’s
decision has strong rather than weak impact on personal outcomes
(Fig. 1B and D versus Fig. 1C and E); in-group-protection as a
motive for non-cooperation is stronger when the out-group
representative’s decision has strong rather than weak impact on
outcomes to in-group members (Fig. 1B and E versus Fig. 1C and
D).
Following instructions using the games in Fig. 1B—1E
(depending on condition; Materials and Methods), participants
made five anonymous choices without feedback about their
protagonist’s choice, were asked each time to accurately assess
how often their protagonist made a non-cooperative choice (range
0–5), and answered questions about their reasons for non-
cooperation (in-group tending, protectionism) (Materials and
Methods).
Results
All data were analyzed in 2 (Treatment: Oxytocin/Placebo)62
(Personal Vulnerability: High/Low)62 (In-Group Vulnerability:
High/Low) between-subjects ANOVAs. For non-cooperation
there was a main effect for Personal Vulnerablity, F(1,94) = 7.86,
p=0.006, partial g2 = 0.076, a trend towards an interaction
between In-Group Vulnerability and Treatment, F(1,94) = 3.19,
p=0.077, and a significant three-way interaction, F(1,94) = 5.97,
p=0.016, partial g2 = 0.06. Fig. 2A shows relatively high levels of
non-cooperation when Personal Vulnerability was high, and non-
cooperation was not influenced by Treatment, In-group Vulner-
ability, or their interaction, Fs,1. When Personal Vulnerability
was low, however, non-cooperation was higher when In-Group
Vulnerability was high rather than low, but only among
individuals given oxytocin rather than placebo (In-group Vulner-
ability6Treatment interaction, F[1,99] = 9.10, p=0.003; Fig. 2A).
Oxytocin-induced non-cooperation appears motivated by the
desire to protect vulnerable in-group members, as predicted in
hypothesis (iii). Indeed, as predicted in hypothesis (i), in-group
tending was higher when participants received oxytocin rather
than placebo, M=3.828 vs. M=3.002, F(1,94) = 7.23, p=0.008,
partial g2 = 0.071 (all other F,3.00, p.0.10) In-group defending
was measured in 72 participants (Methods & Materials), and was
predicted by a significant Treatment6In-Group Vulnerability
interaction, F(1,64) = 7.18, p,0.010, partial g2 = 0.093. Fig. 2B
shows that, regardless the level of personal vulnerability, in-group
defending is higher when in-group vulnerability is high rather than
low, but only among individuals who received oxytocin,
F(1,69) = 6.18, p,0.015 rather than placebo, F(1,69) = 1.89,
p,0.178. Further supporting hypothesis (ii), in-group defending
positively related to non-cooperation, r(72) = 0.428, p,0.001.
The game structure was symmetrical (see Fig. 1B–E), and
participant non-cooperation may have been (also) motivated by
condition-dependent expectations of the out-group representa-
tive’s cooperativeness. However, ANOVA revealed no effects on
expectations (all F[1,94],1.41, ps.0.238, partial g2,0.015;
Moverall = 2.873, SD=1.978): Oxytocin’s effects on participants’
non-cooperation cannot be attributed to altered expectations of
out-group behavior.
To explore whether in-group protection creates excessive non-
cooperation, we analyzed the difference between participant non-
cooperation and expected out-group non-cooperation. This
revealed, first, more excessive non-cooperation when personal
vulnerability was high (M=0.715) rather than low (M=20.095),
F(1,94) = 5.59, p=0.020, partial g2 = 0.056. Second, we observed
a Treatment by In-Group Vulnerability interaction,
F(1,94) = 4.14, p,0.045, partial g2 = 0.042 (all other F,1.51, all
p.0.22) (see Fig. 2C). When given placebo, participants matched
the level of expected out-group non-cooperation, whether in-
group vulnerability was high (M=0.115) or low (M=0.522),
F(1,99) = 0.65, p=0.424. When given oxytocin, however, partic-
ipants’ level of non-cooperation was higher when in-group
vulnerability was high (M=0.778) rather than low (M=20.192),
F(1,99) = 4.01, p=0.048. In fact, and as shown in Fig. 2C, only
when in-group vulnerability was high and participants received
oxytocin did the difference between own non-cooperation and
expected out-group non-cooperation differ from 0 (one-sample
t[27] = 2.294, p,0.030; all other t,|1.199|, ps..243). Thus,
males engaged in excessive non-cooperation when in-group
vulnerability was high and they received oxytocin rather than
placebo.
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Discussion
The neuropeptide oxytocin not only motivates cooperation
towards familiar others, and those belonging to one’s in-group
[17,34,36], it also drives vigilance and time-on-guard [37] as well
as non-cooperation towards rivaling out-groups [17,41]. Through
a newly developed inter-group game we clarified that earlier
Figure 2. Non-Cooperation, In-Group Defending, and Excessive Non-Cooperation. (A). Under low personal vulnerability, oxytocin
produces more non-cooperation than placebo when in-group vulnerability is high rather than low (range 0–5, displayed 6SE). (B). Compared to
placebo, oxytocin enhances motivation to defend the in-group when in-group vulnerability is high rather than low (based on N= 72; range 1–7,
displayed 6SE). (C). Excessive non-cooperation (i.e., own non-cooperation.expected out-group non-cooperation; range 25 to +5; displayed 6SE)
emerges under high in-group vulnerability when individuals received oxytocin rather than placebo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046751.g002
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findings should not be interpreted as if oxytocin increases the
individual’s motivation to serve personal interests. Rather, findings
here reveal that oxytocin-motivated non-cooperation is driven by
the desire to protect vulnerable in-group members, even when
immediate self-interest is not at stake. The male participants in our
study behaved as the proverbial Mamma Bear who, while not
being immediately in danger herself, lashes out against predators
threatening her cubs. As predicted, such protective behavior
emerged especially when participants received oxytocin rather
than placebo.
Because groups were ad hoc and formed on the basis of a trivial
criterion the (vulnerable) individuals protected here were relative
strangers and not genetically related to the participant, findings are
at odds with kin-selection theory of altruism that predicts altruism
to be close to absent for genetically unrelated others [44]. Findings
are consistent, however, with recent advances in natural selection
theory on (human) eusociality [45,46]. In essence, the idea is that
altruism benefits group survival and that humans—like other
eusocial species such as ants and honeybees—have evolved
capacity to quickly learn who does, and does not, belong to the
in-group and learned to act on those insights to further group
(rather than personal) survival and prosperity. Extensive work in
social psychological science further attests to the fact that humans
are highly flexible in creating cognitive representations of in-group
versus out-group, and act upon those social categorizations quickly
by favoring the in-group relative to the out-group [47,48]. As
shown here, and elsewhere [17,36,40,49], oxytocin appears pivotal
in up-regulating the human response to (arbitrary) in-group/out-
group distinctions, shifting the focus from protecting and
promoting oneself towards protecting and promoting the (mem-
bers of the) in-group [50].
There is no evidence that oxytocin motivates greed and spiteful
tendencies towards rivaling out-groups [17,36]. The behavioral
decision game developed here thus varied fear parameters and
held constant greed and cooperator’s gain. The game structure
can be altered, however, to create varying levels of greed too. One
avenue for new research is to study neurohormonal influences on
greed-driven non-cooperation towards rivaling out-groups.
Whereas oxytocin may be unrelated to greed, we surmise that
such exploitative non-cooperation may be a function of vasopres-
sin and testosterone, neurohormones shown to be involved in
aggression and dominance seeking [51,52].
Whether self-interest and the interest of fellow in-group
members can be truly separated may be debatable. For example,
human and non-human cooperation may be explained as serving
the individual’s long-term personal interests in survival and
(re)productive success, and defense-motivated non-cooperation
towards an out-group accrues quality signals to the individual that
provide long-term benefits [5,9,10,11]. Rather than attempting to
solve this deep philosophical question, we approached this issue by
creating varying degrees to which the out-group protagonist
threatened immediate personal interests, and those of fellow in-
group members, and we observed these varying degrees of threat
to have meaningful impact on human cooperation and competi-
tion. The decision making was one-shot and private, rendering
moot the motivation to acquire quality signals from which one
benefits in the long-run. As such, the behavioral game developed
here provides a useful step towards disentangling self-interested
versus group-serving motives underlying human cooperation,
ultimately providing an empirical answer to the penultimate
question whether humans are, indeed, a cooperative species
[53,54].
Participants engaged in decision making without feedback. In as
much as cooperation tends to elicit cooperation, non-cooperation
often begets non-cooperative responses [11,55]. From this it
follows that the defense-motivated non-cooperation induced by
oxytocin may provoke non-cooperative responses in the out-group
protagonist, potentiating a vicious spiral of increasingly compet-
itive exchange. This would be particularly likely when non-
cooperation is excessive, as we observed here when individuals
were given oxytocin and fellow in-group members were vulner-
able. Accordingly, oxytocin appears to direct individuals towards
their in-group, motivating not only trust and generosity towards
the in-group, but also strong motivation to protect and defend the
in-group against outside threat. Inadvertently, such oxytocin-
modulated tend-and-defend tendencies may trigger non-coopera-
tion in outsiders, and create the very threat that individuals under
oxytocin tried to ward off.
Materials and Methods
Participant Recruitment and Test Medication
Males (N=105; Mean age= 21.13 years, SD=1.29) were
recruited via an on-line system and offered J10 (approx. USD
13) for participating in a study on medication and decision-
making. Exclusion criteria were significant medical or psychiatric
illness, prescription-based medication, smoking more than five
cigarettes per day, and drug or alcohol abuse. Data of three
participants were discarded because they erred on all six questions
verifying their understanding of the experimental game. The
experiment was approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee of
the University of Amsterdam, and adhered to the guidelines set
forth in the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants provided
informed consent prior to the experiment.
Participants were instructed to refrain from smoking or drinking
(except water) for 2 hours before the experiment and randomly
assigned to the oxytocin or placebo group (double-blind, placebo-
controlled study design). Participants self-administered a single
intranasal dose of 24 IU oxytocin (Syntocinon-Spray, Novartis; 3
puffs per nostril) or placebo. The placebo contained all the active
ingredients except for the neuropeptide, was prepared according
to Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and Good Clinical
Practice (GCP), and delivered in the same bottles as Syntocinon.
Experimental Procedures
Participants came to the laboratory and learned that pay was
equivalent to their show-up fee and their earnings during the
decision task (range J1—J8). Data were collected in Spring 2011
(N=75), and in Spring 2012 (N=30). Analyses revealed no
interaction effects involving data collection wave on any of the
dependent variables and this factor is further ignored. Participants
were seated in individual cubicles preventing them from seeing
others and communicating, signed an informed consent, and self-
administered the medication under experimenter supervision. The
experimenter left and participants completed a series of unrelated
questionnaires and tests that were presented on their computer
screen, using the keyboard to answer questions.
Because effects of oxytocin plateau after approximately 35 min
[26] and in keeping with earlier studies [17,27], the computer
switched to the experimental instructions after 30 minutes.
Participants read that they would engage in a decision making
task involving the participant’s own group (denoted as ‘‘Triangle’’),
and another group (denoted as ‘‘Circle;’’ labeling was counterbal-
anced but had no effects and is further ignored). Groups were
composed on the basis of the order in which participants had
signed up for the experiments, so that most but not necessarily all
involved individuals were currently present in the laboratory. They
were also told that each group contained three members, and that
Oxytocin Motivates Protection
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they would not know who was in their group or who was in the
other group.
Participants then read that their income to ‘‘Triangle’’ (their in-
group) and to ‘‘Circle’’ (the out-group) depended on the
participant’s own decisions, and those of a representative of
Circle’s whom they would be paired with through the computer
network. A table showed the payoffs to Triangle (in-group) and
Circle (out-group) as a function of the four possible combinations
of choices (1 or 2 by in-group; 1 or 2 by out-group, with
1 =Cooperation, and 2=Non-cooperation). We altered the
cardinal payoffs to create variation in Personal and In-Group
Vulnerability while at the same time maintaining the ordinal
structure of the game as well as Greed and Cooperator’s Gain (see
main text). This resulted in four different games (see Fig. 1B—1E,
main text), and participants were randomly assigned to one of
these.
After being fully trained on the decision game, participants
answered quiz questions (analyses showed that all participants
except three—whose data were discarded—understood the game
and the implications of their choices, and that understanding did
not vary across conditions), were assured that decisions would
remain confidential, and asked five times to make a choice
between 1 (cooperation) and 2 (non-cooperation) (no feedback was
given). To motivate serious decision making, participants were
reminded prior to each choice that this choice might be randomly
selected for pay-out to all members of Triangle and Circle. As
participants interacted through the computer network they could
not see each other. Following decision making, we assessed in-
group tending (‘‘during decision making I tried to serve the
interests of my group’’ and ‘‘during decision making I tried to help
my team’’) (always 1 =not at all, to 7= very much) and in-group
protection (‘‘when making decisions, I tried to protect my own
group,’’ and ‘‘during decision making, I tried to prevent losses to
my own group). Due to a programming error, data on in-group
protection were recorded only for the Spring 2011 wave. The
main experimental task (instructions, decision making, and post-
task questionnaire) took 14—17 min. Upon finishing the ques-
tionnaire, participants were thanked and dismissed. They returned
four to six weeks later to pick up a sealed envelope containing their
credits, additional earnings, and a full debriefing. We used a time-
lag between experimental session and debriefing to prevent that
any insight on methods and materials became known before the
entire experiment was completed. All participants agreed to this
procedure.
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